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this that religious belief, or piety, is extraneous to them in every sense? In the case of men of truly moral sentiment we may well doubt the possibility of their total irreligiousness; for the upright man who is earnestly interested not merely in the appearance of the good or external legality and respectability, but for the good itself, cannot but attribute to the good the highest right in the world, and therefore must demand its victorious assertion and accomplishment in reality. But in demanding this, and feeling the right of this demand, he will also have the courage to believe in its truth, to believe therefore in the good as the true power over the world, or in such a constitution of the actual world that it must serve as a means for the realization of the good."

Dr. Pfeiderer's discussion of the relation of religion to reason seems to me good. If any one has been misled by Mr. Benjamin Kidd's views about the "ultra-rational," these volumes might serve as a useful antidote. The tone of the book is perhaps too much that of a preacher; but on the whole it supplies a temperate statement of some of the best results of modern speculation on such matters; and while neither for its philosophic nor for its literary power can it for a moment be compared with Professor Caird's book on the same subject (to which, in its broad outlines, it bears a strong resemblance), yet it is possible that its more cautious and eclectic spirit may commend it more to a certain class of readers. The translation does not appear to be very satisfactorily done. Some of the sentences are thoroughly German in structure and idiom, and a few of them are scarcely intelligible.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

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LECTURES ON THE BASES OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF. Delivered in Oxford and London in April and May, 1893. By Charles B. Upton, B.A., B.Sc., Professor of Philosophy in Manchester College. [*The Hibbert Lectures*, 1893.] London: Williams & Norgate, 1894. Pp. xii., 364.

In his preface, Professor Upton says that the aim of these lectures is "to find a natural and rational ground for Theism in the normal self-consciousness of mankind." "The philosophical writers," he adds, "whose works have had the greatest influence on the composition of these lectures are Dr. James Martineau and the late Professor Hermann Lotze; and the position of these two distinguished thinkers on the basal question of the Freedom of the Will is accepted and expounded." Like "his revered teacher in philosophy," to whom this volume is fittingly dedicated, Professor Upton appeals in the last resort to the intuitions of the individual

consciousness, though there are many passages which seem to show that he has departed from the individualist or "idio-psychological" thinking of Dr. Martineau farther than he would, perhaps, admit. Like Lotze, Professor Upton admits the untenableness of a "pluralist" metaphysics; though, like Lotze, in criticising "Absolute Idealism," he seems to fall back on a pluralist manner of envisaging the universe. On page 226 we read, "In the case of our own self-consciousness, it is just because we are not merely individual minds, but are through the immanent Divine reason indivisibly united with the eternal life of God, that we are able to pass from the merely personal to the universal point of view, to impartially compare ourselves with others and pass judgment upon our worth." Such a passage reminds one of T. H. Green. Yet, on page 322, it is urged that "Idealism cannot allow to the individual man the possession of a real and permanent Self, to whom a certain independent causality and freedom of action is delegated by the Eternal;" and on page 307, God is spoken of as waiting "to see the issue of that moral freedom which He has conferred on us," so that "the relation between the individual soul and God is of perpetual and ever-new interest to the Eternal as well as to man." Similarly, on page 334, Professor Upton quotes, approvingly, some rather doggerel verses of Browning:

"God, whose pleasure brought
Man into being, stands away,
As it were, a hand-breadth off, to give
Room for the newly-made to live,
And look at Him from a place apart
And use his gifts of brain and heart."

Such language is undoubtedly in accord with the usual picture-thinking of popular religion; but is it in accord with the admission of an immanent divine reason? If in any strict sense the individual human soul is "a *real* and *permanent* Self," and if "God" has to wait to see what will happen, is not this a system of pluralism (or, as we might call it, polytheism), which, in Lotze's phrase, will have to give place, for those who try to think coherently, to a deeper "Monism" behind it? And if the name "God" be used in philosophical discussion, must it not be reserved for the Reason which, if the universe is ultimately a rational system, is immanent in both the "waiting God" and the souls to whom freedom is "delegated"? If there is no such immanent Reason in the last resort, the universe is not a rational system, but chance or fate is supreme. It is very

clear that the dogma of "free will," surviving where most other dogmas have been discarded, is what keeps back Professor Upton from accepting an Idealist solution. The question cannot be discussed in this brief notice; but may one ask Professor Upton, and those who like him demand "a real free will," to believe that the cautious determinist does not believe in fatalism, and that moral responsibility seems inexplicable to him except on the supposition that motives are "causes" of actions exactly in the same sense (and in the same sense only) as that in which one physical phenomenon is called the cause of another?

The volume may be cordially recommended as, among other things, an interesting, temperate, and lucid exposition of the free-will doctrine.

D. G. RITCHIE.

MONISM, AS CONNECTING RELIGION AND SCIENCE. The Confession of Faith of a Man of Science. By Ernst Haeckel. Translated from the German by J. Gilchrist, M.A., B.Sc., Ph.D. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1894. Pp. viii., 117.

It is doubtful whether it was worth while to translate this little essay. The tone of it is somewhat offensively dogmatic; the speculations of the author in departments of science other than his own strike one as being a trifle crude; and some of the remarks, such as that "every religious dogma which represents God as a 'Spirit' in human form, degrades Him to a 'gaseous vertebrate,'" are in questionable taste. Still, the high reputation of the author gives his book a certain claim to attention, and, no doubt, it will be of interest to some readers of this JOURNAL. Fortunately, it only occupies a little over a hundred pages.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

PLATO'S REPUBLIC. The Greek Text. Edited, with Notes and Essays, by the late B. Jowett, M.A., Master of Balliol College, Oxford, and Lewis Campbell, LL.D., Emeritus Professor of Greek in the University of St. Andrews. In Three Volumes. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press, 1894. Pp. xv., 490; xxxiv., 356; 512.

These three handsome volumes are chiefly interesting to the Greek scholar rather than to the student of Ethics; and they cannot here be reviewed at length. They impress one, however, as being one of the most solid contributions to philosophical